This paper aims to take stock of global efforts towards financial reform since the start of the financial crisis in 2007-08, and to provide a synthetic (if simplified) picture of their status as of January 2012. Underlying dynamics are described and analyzed both at the global level (particularly G-20, IMF, and FSB) and in individual jurisdictions, as well as the impact the crisis has had on these regions. The possible next steps of financial reform are then reviewed, including: the ongoing crisis management in Europe, the new emphasis on macroprudential approaches, the challenges posed by globally integrated financial firms, the implementation of harmonized global standards, and the links between financial systems and growth.
INtroductIoN
Financial reform has been a core dimension of the initial global policy response to the financial turmoil of 2007-08. At the first G-20 summit of heads of state and government in November 2008, more than four-fifths of the action points in the final declaration were about financial regulation (Rottier and Véron 2010b) . Obviously, the crisis is not over at the time of writing, and the cycle of financial reform it triggered is very far from complete. But it can be said confidently that the crisis has been transformational for financial regulatory policy, at least in the United States and Europe. 1 One of the key lessons of the crisis is the close interdependence between the detailed features of financial systems and macroeconomic outcomes. Thus, the tight separation of financial and macroeconomic issues, which is entrenched both in academia and in the policymaking community, needs to be overcome. Initiatives to better analyze "macrofinancial" linkages and to conduct "macroprudential" policy have mushroomed since the start of the crisis, although they generally fall short of a fully joined-up framework. From this perspective, the focus of this paper is financial regulation in an old-fashioned sense, understood as a cluster of interrelated policies designed to ensure the proper functioning and integrity of financial systems. This scope includes public regulation and supervision of bank capital, leverage, liquidity, and risk management; control of moral hazard and financial industry incentives; protection of the customers of financial services; and the regulation of capital markets. Other reform areas such as capital-flow controls, prevention of money laundering, and the taxation of financial activities can overlap with this agenda, but are not considered here part of it in a strict sense.
The general impetus of financial reform as a reaction to the crisis, in the United States and Europe, has been toward more regulation, or reregulation. This is admittedly too simplistic a generalization: This policy area is multidimensional and cannot be reduced to a simple choice between less or more regulation.
Nevertheless, there was a clear turning point in 2008 with the renewed realization that financial systems, including banking systems, could not be left to their own devices, both because of the large potential economic cost of financial crises and because public expenditure is often a key component of their resolution. For a variety of reasons this age-old wisdom was neglected in the preceding decade in both the United States and Europe more than in the rest of the world, including Australia, Canada, Japan, and emerging economies.
Financial regulation is a complex thicket of highly technical policy challenges, often subject to the use of mutually incomprehensible jargons even as they are mutually interrelated. The devil is generally in 1. The sequence of financial events that started in the summer of 2007 and is still unfolding at the time of writing has been referred to under various monikers including the subprime crisis, the late-2000s financial crisis, the Great Recession, or the global financial crisis. As none of these is fully satisfactory or has been universally adopted, we simply refer to this sequence as "the crisis." the details, and elegant quantitative models of policy trade-offs are rarely available. Analytical frameworks tend to be similarly fragmented across different academic silos, including economics, financial research, accounting, political science, and sociology. From an economic research perspective, this is a less mature field than other policy areas such as fiscal, trade, or labor. Hopefully, the crisis itself will result in new avenues for research, the results of which might start to become available in a few years' time.
The first section of this paper examines the dynamics of financial reform as they have unfolded since the start of the crisis. The second and last section looks at the forthcoming challenges and future prospects. Accord. In the case of accounting, the European Union's decision to adopt IFRS, made at the political level in 2000, finalized through the above-mentioned 2002 regulation, and implemented in 2005-06, was the trigger for their subsequent adoption by a significant number of jurisdictions that now represent about half of the aggregate market capitalization of large companies worldwide (Véron 2011) . In the case of Basel II, the European Union was instrumental in the negotiation of the accord in the first place, and was among the first to implement it with the adoption of the Capital Requirements Directives and subsequent rulemaking in individual member states. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, by September 2011, implementation of the Basel II Accord was complete in 21 of the committee's 27 member countries, with at least two more countries planning to join in 2012 (BCBS 2011b).
Since the start of the crisis, financial reform has resulted from a sometimes complex and iterative combination of discussions and initiatives, at both at the individual jurisdictions and international levels.
the G-20
The emergence of the G-20 as the "premier forum for […] Fund (IMF) adopted a significant realignment of its quota shares resulting in the presence of the four largest emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, and Russia) among its ten largest shareholders.
Second, beyond its impact on the landscape of global financial institutions, the G-20 launched a series of individual initiatives in the area of global financial regulation. As previously mentioned, this was particularly the case during the first G-20 summit in Washington, in which 39 out of 47 items in the final declaration were about financial regulation in the sense used in this paper. The specific impact of the G-20 in this field is not easy to assess precisely. Some initiatives were given G-20 endorsement but would probably have gone ahead anyway. In other cases, the G-20 set deadlines that the authority of the heads of state and governments effectively made binding. This was seen in the negotiation of the Basel III accord on bank capital, leverage, liquidity, and risk management, which was published in 2010 after less than two years of negotiations (compared to its predecessor (Basel II), which took six years to complete).
In other cases, however, the G-20 set deadlines that were not met, and it is unclear to what extent it had an actual impact on the related work of specialized global financial authorities. that assessing the FSB's contribution to the policy process is far from straightforward. In some cases, the FSB's work can be little more than reporting initiatives of its members (into which it has had essentially no input); in other cases, FSB leadership is essential for pressing other bodies into taking action. In practice, there appears to be a continuum of situations between these two extremes.
Individual Jurisdictions
The pattern of financial reform initiatives has been extremely different from one jurisdiction to another, notwithstanding the coordination efforts deployed in G-20 summit and FSB initiatives. Multiple factors converge when explaining the differences of approach, including long-standing variations of institutions, culture, and economic structures, as well as different patterns of impact of the crisis itself.
The Unites States has had a comparatively linear sequence of crisis management and resolution, legislative debate and decision, and implementation of new legislation by specialized authorities. , and framework for bank crisis management and resolution (forthcoming), to name only the most prominent pieces. Inevitably, the fact that so many different pieces of legislation are debated and decided upon while the financial crisis continues raises risks of legislative inconsistency and of short-term considerations prevailing over longer term ones.
Moreover, in the European Union important financial legislation is also set at the national level, 
crisis-Induced shifts
In comparison to the preceding two decades, the crisis has induced shifts in the interplay between the public and private sectors, between political and technical factors, between the global and jurisdictional levels, and between developed and emerging jurisdictions. Generalizations are difficult in this analysis because reform dynamics vary widely across specific issue areas and jurisdictions, before and after the start of the crisis. Nevertheless, a few trend changes can be identified at a general level. authorities. Financial regulators and supervisors, like central bankers, have acted under the general public's eye since the start of the crisis to an extent that was rarely seen in the previous era.
Third, the crisis has affected in multiple ways the boundaries between global and local financial policymaking, even though this transformation cannot be described as a uniform trend. On the face of it, the creation of the G-20 has appeared, at least initially, to be a significant shift toward global decision making in the financial regulatory area. Many political leaders, particularly those from large Western European countries, heralded the need to define "global solutions" to a crisis that was described as a "global problem." Indeed, the G-20 agreements to adopt the Basel III accord or to move the clearing of over-the-counter derivatives to central counterparties, even though they are not yet fully implemented, were landmark instances of international joint regulatory action with few precedents in the preceding two decades. However, there have also been crisis-related setbacks in terms of the regulatory underpinnings of global financial integration. This particularly applies to the European Commission, which was a determined champion of global regulatory harmonization throughout the 1990s and 2000s but has shifted markedly since 2008 towards a more unilateralist stance in many areas. At play has been the fact that it is intrinsically more difficult to achieve international regulatory convergence in an era of financial reregulation than in an era of liberalization (Rottier and Véron 2010a) . The UK Independent
Commission on Banking's suggestion to ring-fence the retail operations of international banks is another illustration of the way the crisis is shifting the limit between globally integrated and jurisdiction-specific regulatory and supervisory approaches.
Fourth, the crisis has accelerated the transition from a western-dominated financial world toward a more globally balanced one in which large emerging countries play an increasingly significant role, with consequences for financial regulation that remain difficult to predict. To various degrees, the memberships and/or governance structures of the IMF, the FSB, the Basel Committee, and other committees hosted be an American. Plainly, the shift from G-7 to G-20 has not yet translated into these selection processes, and the same is true at less visible levels: For example, half of the FSB's member countries are emerging economies, but the vast majority of its working groups and task forces are headed by westerners. It appears likely that the wider diversity of participants should gradually result in leadership roles being taken by emerging-economy representatives, at least in some areas. Even so, it remains to be seen how keen these new entrants will be to empower global financial authorities and effective international cross-border regulatory convergence, in absolute terms and in comparison with the western incumbents.
chAlleNGes ANd outlook
It is far too early to present a settled picture of post-crisis financial reforms and their impact on the global financial system. Huge challenges remain and it is still unclear how they will be met. First and foremost, the crisis has not yet been resolved, and the interaction between crisis management and long-term reform creates uncertainties of its own. Second, in spite of widespread calls for "macroprudential" approaches, the interaction of financial-sector policy with other dimensions of economic policymaking remains largely unsettled. Third, how to effectively regulate cross-border financial firms remains a fundamentally unanswered question. Fourth, other reforms will be difficult to implement in an internationally consistent manner, raising concerns about the possible fragmentation of the global financial space. Fifth, the reforms will affect the financial system's contribution to economic growth in multiple ways, which on the whole remain poorly understood.
ongoing crisis management
The most obvious uncertainty is that the financial crisis is far from over. Although it was partly overcome in the United States in 2009, it is still worsening in Europe and could again spillover to other parts of the world. This creates a triple risk of forbearance, populism, and irrelevance.
Concerns about financial instability in jurisdictions where the financial crisis remains unresolved, including much of continental Europe at the time of writing, can easily lead to excessive forbearance as has been the case in several past episodes of systemic banking fragility, such as in Japan in the 1990s. is arguably impossible to eliminate moral hazard from banking sector policy frameworks, but it is arguably even more difficult to prevent it when such frameworks are prepared in a climate of systemic instability.
The risk of populism complements that of forbearance, and the two can be simultaneous. As the ongoing crisis creates a political demand for action, and action at a fundamental level is prevented by the bias towards forbearance, policymakers can be tempted to adopt a punitive attitude toward the financial sector, in response to popular perceptions rather than in-depth policy analysis. This has arguably been the case with initiatives, particularly in the European Union, to put hard limits on the scope of remuneration practices in the financial industry and to impose specific taxation on aspects of financial activity. In certain cases, such impulses can be aligned with strategies of "financial repression," namely the forced investment of domestic savings in government securities, or in other forms of repression of market mechanisms for price setting and capital allocation, such as the attempts to discourage some forms of hedging against sovereign risk or to suspend the publication of credit rating decisions affecting troubled countries. Given the complexity of financial regulation, it can be difficult to disentangle such populist motivations from other drivers of financial reform. Nevertheless, they are likely to gain in prominence if the European crisis worsens and leads to more financial and economic dislocation.
Furthermore, embarking in long-term financial reform while a major financial crisis is still ongoing and unresolved creates a risk of irrelevance of the corresponding legislative and regulatory initiatives, to the extent that the eventual crisis resolution can be expected to usher in a new round of reform to ensure Each of these three factors, in certain circumstances, can contribute positively to the quality of policymaking. Forbearance can be a rational calculation to minimize financial dislocation, even though it increases moral hazard. Populism can help assert the autonomy of financial reform against pressure from the financial industry. Successive rounds of regulatory reform can result in gradual improvements of the regulatory framework and correction of past missteps. But each of them can also easily have negative consequences in terms of the sustainability and efficiency of the financial policy framework.
macroprudential Approaches
Events since 2007 have revealed embarrassing blind spots in the pre-crisis understanding of the financial system by policymakers, but also by the academic community. Thus, there has been an understandable drive to introduce a more comprehensive and joined-up approach to financial regulation. This has resulted in an emphasis on "macroprudential" policies and institutions, using an expression developed well before the crisis by the Bank for International Settlements (Clement 2010) .
Perhaps the most visible consequence has been the creation of new bodies with a mandate to contribute to system-wide financial stability in most jurisdictions affected by the crisis. In the United In the United Kingdom, the macroprudential body is part of the central bank and chaired by the bank's governor, even though its membership is distinct from that of the Monetary Policy Committee. At the European Union level and in Belgium, it is also chaired by the central bank's governor but is legally autonomous and includes representatives of multiple public entities. In the United States and in France, it is chaired by the Finance Minister, suggesting further distance from monetary policy.
The macroprudential concept, as described by one of its early promoters (Borio 2010) , has a time dimension (how risk in the financial system evolves over time) and a cross-sectional dimension (how risk is allocated among financial-system participants at a given point of time). Beyond the institutional machinery, there are challenges in both dimensions. On the first, policies to adjust some financial regulatory instruments over the financial cycle in order to mitigate their pro-cyclical effect or to make them counter-cyclical remain tentative at best. Specifically, the Basel III framework envisages that regulated entities will be required to build up counter-cyclical capital buffers, but supervisory authorities may prove reluctant to take a stance on the shape of the financial cycle that could be proved inaccurate by future developments. The cross-sectional dimension has given rise to more follow-up, with the crisisinduced recognition that all financial firms have a potential impact on system stability, and that regulatory silos that separate the respective policy frameworks for depository institutions, insurers, investment funds, etc., can be irrelevant or even counterproductive from a systemic stability standpoint. This concern partly underlies the new processes for registration of long unregulated or lightly regulated actors such as private equity and hedge funds in both the European Union ( Other individual jurisdictions will follow suit, but some may be reluctant to single out specific firms as systemically significant, partly out of concern about creating competitive distortions in the domestic financial environment, and also because of different perceptions about the specific risks associated with "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions (Goldstein and Véron 2011) .
Beyond these two dimensions, macroprudential concerns have also been invoked to justify controls imposed on external capital flows in order to mitigate the risks associated with "hot money." In particular, the crisis has triggered a reversal of the IMF's position on capital controls, which are now viewed as an acceptable tool of financial stability policy if correctly wielded (Ostry et al. 2011) . This illustrates the elasticity of the macroprudential concept and of its boundaries with, on the one hand, monetary policy run by central banks, and on the other hand, microprudential supervision of individual financial firms by prudential supervisors. While the crisis has clearly underlined the need to monitor not only individual regulated institutions but also the financial system as a whole, the best way to reach this objective is unlikely to become a matter of universal consensus in the short term or even the medium term.
regulating multinational financial firms
The crisis has brought a sense of urgency to another long-standing challenge: the resolution of the difficulties posed by multinational financial firms. These can shift risks across borders in ways that escape the oversight of national supervisors, as was illustrated by the concentration of risk in the Londonbased operations of AIG Financial Products, which precipitated the downfall of the entire AIG Group.
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Moreover, when such firms collapse, the absence of a centralized resolution process creates the scope for considerable uncertainty and cross-border contagion, a striking example of which was provided by the Union and to a greater extent China and India, have adopted standards that vary from IFRS in ways that can have significant impact for some issuers, resulting in what can be described as "IFRS dialects" (Véron 2011 ). The United States has not yet determined its position on eventual IFRS adoption, but is likely to include a strong "dialectal" component as well. If such dialects multiply, the risk is that the central promise of IFRS, namely the cross-border comparability of corporate financial statements, will not be delivered.
financial systems and Growth
Finally, one of the most open questions of all is how the post-crisis financial reform agenda might affect the ability of the financial sector to contribute to overall economic growth. This issue too has multiple dimensions.
As mentioned above, the consequences of tighter capital requirements on economic growth have been a matter of heated controversy in the context of the preparation of Basel III, with a stark contrast between simulations conducted by the financial industry that predicted a devastating effect of the proposed rules on future output (IIF 2010) , and those of the supervisory community that forecasted a much milder impact (MAG 2010 and BCBS 2010a) . Ultimately, the G-20 leaders implicitly endorsed the Basel committee's more sanguine assessment when they adopted Basel III at the November 2010 Seoul Summit.
However, this quantitative argument fails to capture the complexity of the impact of financial reform on growth. In most countries in the developed world at least, large companies have fairly easy access to international capital markets, and their funding conditions are not overly affected by domestic regulatory frameworks. Smaller companies and other borrowers, by contrast, including younger firms which have the greatest growth potential (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranada 2010) , have no such access, and their ability to mobilize external finance is likely to be most affected by financial reforms. What is at stake is not just the aggregate volume of credit, but how this credit is allocated by heterogeneous intermediaries towards heterogeneous firms and other borrowers. Regulated banks are only one part of this picture, which includes the loosely defined "shadow banking system" (FSB 2011a) and interacts with the broader economy in ways that existing economic models generally fail to describe comprehensively.
In particular, the impact of the ongoing movement towards reregulation on global financial integration could materially impact economic trends, to the extent that financial openness is associated with higher levels of economic growth (Cline 2010) . Also, how regulation might encourage or limit competition among financial intermediaries, innovation in financial services, and the allocation of capital to risky new ventures, remains poorly understood, especially given the large number of interrelated recent or ongoing financial reform initiatives.
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